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Targeted Fully Homomorphic Encryption Based on a Double
Decryption Algorithm for Polynomials
Yatao Yang, Shuang Zhang , Junming Yang, Jia Li, and Zichen Li
Abstract: Several public-key encryption schemes used to solve the problem of ciphertext data processing on the
fly are discussed. A new targeted fully homomorphic encryption scheme based on the discrete logarithm problem
is presented. Public-key encryption cryptosystems are classified to examine homomorphic encryption. Without
employing techniques proposed by Gentry such as somewhat homomorphic and bootstrapping techniques, or
relinearization technique proposed by Brakerski et al., a new method called ”Double Decryption Algorithm” is
employed in our cryptography to satisfy a fully or targeted fully homomorphic property. Inspired by ElGamal and
BGN cryptography, we obtain the desired fully homomorphic property by selecting a new group and adding an extra
component to the ciphertext. Proof of semantic security is also demonstrated.
Key words: targeted fully homomorphic encryption; discrete logarithm problem; exponential function method; power
function method

1

Introduction

With the rapid development of cloud computing and
big data processing, homomorphic encryption has
become a key technology for protecting user privacy
and processing ciphertext data. As a result, fully
homomorphic encryption is in urgent demand.
In 2009, the first fully homomorphic encryption
scheme, which is based on ideal lattice and is
of great theoretical significance, was proposed by
Gentry[1, 2] . However, there are several problems with
the application of this scheme. First, it simulates
the algorithm with circuits, which is referred to as
circuit homomorphism. Any arithmetic operation can
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be decomposed into basic operations such as “+” and
“”, whereas it is difficult or even impossible to
transform complex arithmetic operations into circuit
operations. Second, a new security assumption, i.e.,
the Sparse Subset Sum Problem (SSSP) assumption,
whose security has not been verified, has been
introduced at the stage of squashing the decryption
circuit. In addition, Lee[3] indicated that the SSSP
is not hard. Third, Gentry’s idea is to reduce the
complexity of the decryption circuit as much as
possible. However, the size of the public key and the
complexity of the encryption circuits are increasing
significantly. As a result, CPUs cannot perform such
complex operations. Assuming that Moore’s Law has
no limit, the processing power required to perform fully
homomorphic encryption needs at least 30 years of
development. All of these problems must be overcome
to realize a fully homomorphic encryption design.
Other related work has applied other technology. In
2010, a fully homomorphic encryption over the
integer was presented by Dijk et al., i.e., the DGHV
scheme[4] . The complexity of the DGHV scheme
has been improved, however, efficiency and security
remain a bottleneck of this scheme. In 2013, the
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Chinese Remainder Theorem was applied by Cheon
et al.[5] to improve the efficiency of the DGHV
scheme. However, the security problem remains
unresolved. A fully homomorphic encryption
scheme without bootstrapping has also been
designed[6] . However, the algorithm demonstrates
low efficiency. In fact, a fully homomorphic encryption
scheme for polynomials with fixed form can be widely
adopted in some areas, such as cryptograph database
retrieval and security multiparty computation. In this
paper, traditional homomorphic public-key encryption
schemes are studied and methods for the design of
a homomorphic map are provided. On this basis, a
new targeted fully homomorphic encryption scheme is
proposed. The efficiency of the proposed scheme is its
main advantage, and its security is based on the discrete
logarithm problem without introducing new unverified
assumptions. In addition, the proposed scheme is
unique in both construction and targeted application.

2

Preliminaries

Let " be a cryptosystem, and c1 ; c2 ;   ; cl are
ciphertexts that correspond to the plaintexts
m1 ; m2 ;   ; ml . Thus, we have following definitions.
Definition 1 (additively homomorphic):
If
N
N
Decrypt.c1 c2 / D m1 C m2 , where
represents
some arithmetic operation, then it is additively
homomorphic.
Definition 2 (multiplicatively homomorphic): If
N
N
Decrypt.c1 c2 / D m1  m2 , where
represents
some arithmetic operation, then it is multiplicatively
homomorphic.
Definition 3 (linearly homomorphic):
If
N N N
Decrypt.c1 c2    cl / D m1 C m2 C    C ml ,
N
where
represents some arithmetic operation, then it
is linearly homomorphic.
Definition 4 (exponentially homomorphic): If
N N N
Decrypt.c1 c2    cl / D m1  m2      ml ,
N
where
represents some arithmetic operation, then it
is exponentially homomorphic.
Definition 5 (targeted fully homomorphic): If one
can obtain some fixed arithmetic operation, i.e., a
targeted polynomial on the plaintext by performing an
arithmetic operation on the ciphertext that corresponds
to the plaintext, then it is targeted fully homomorphic.
Definition 6 (fully homomorphic): A scheme is
fully homomorphic if it is homomorphic for any
polynomial evaluation.
Definition 7 (homogeneous polynomial): Let f be
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a polynomial whose coefficients are integers. If
!
k
l
Y
X
xs;i ;
f .xs;i / D
sD1

i D1

where k is constant, then f is a homogeneous
polynomial with degree k and item l. Furthermore,  D
.k; l/ is the attribute of the homogeneous polynomial.
Any polynomial can be computed from several
homogeneous polynomials.
Definition 8 (equal-length polynomial): Let f be a
polynomial whose coefficients are integers. If
!
k
l
Y
X
di
f .xs;i / D
xs;i ;
sD1

i D1

where k is constant, then f is an equal-length
polynomial with length l and degree k. Furthermore,
we denote  D .k; l/ is the attribute of the equal-length
polynomial.
Note that polynomials with proper form can be
computed from several equal-length polynomials.
Definition 9 (discrete logarithm problem): Let G
be a finite multiplicative group, and g is a generator of
G. Then the discrete logarithm problem is, given any
h 2 G, to find 0 6 x < G with h D g x .

3

Idea of Homomorphism

This section analyzes all homomorphic encryptions in
the literature and discusses methods for constructing
homomorphic maps.
A large number of public-key encryption schemes
were proposed after public-key encryption was
presented by Diffie and Hellman in 1976. It is worth
noting that the majority of the proposed schemes are
homomorphic encryption schemes. We discuss three
main classes of homomorphic encryption schemes
and show how a homomorphic map can be designed
properly.
3.1

RSA class of homomorphic encryption schemes

The RSA class of homomorphic encryption schemes
includes RSA[7] , Rabin[8] , Williams[9, 10] , and so
on. Among such schemes, the RSA cryptosystem is
based on the Euler Theory, and the Rabin cryptosystem
is based on quadratic residues. The flaw of the Rabin
cryptosystem is that four plaintexts are generated by
the decryption algorithm, which results in a significant
amount of work for the decrypter. The Williams
cryptosystem avoids this problem and can perform
decryption properly. The security of all of the above
cryptosystems is based on the big integer factoring
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problem. In the following, the RSA cryptosystem is
used to demonstrate the homomorphic property.
keygen./: takes as input a security parameter 
which denotes the bit length of the module n. Select
two large primes p and q, compute n D pq and '.n/ D
.p 1/.q 1/. Select randomly e with 1 < e < '.n/ and
gcd.e; '.n// D 1, and then compute d , which meets
the condition e  d D 1mod '.n/. Then the public key
is .n; e/, and the secret key is d .
Encrypt./W takes as input the public key and a
plaintext m 2 Zn . This outputs a ciphertext c D
me .mod n/.
Decrypt./: takes as input the secret key and a
ciphertext c and outputs m D c d .mod n/.
Theorem
1 (multiplicatively
homomorphic
property) The RSA cryptosystem is multiplicatively
homomorphic.
Proof Let m1 and m2 be two plaintexts, where c1
and c2 are two ciphertexts that corresponds to m1 and
m2 , respectively, i.e., c1 D me1 .mod n/ and c2 D
me2 .mod n/.
c1  c2 D me1  me2 .mod n/ D .m1  m2 /e .mod n/.
Decrypt.sk; c1  c2 / D .c1  c2 /d .mod n/ D .m1 
m2 /ed .mod n/ D m1  m2 .
Thus, the RSA cryptosystem is multiplicatively
homomorphic.

The homomorphic property lies in the power
function’s homorphism, e.g., let y1 D x1a and y2 D
x2a be two power functions. Then y1 y2 D .x1 x2 /a ,
which maintains the operation. This generates the
multiplicatively homomorphic property. Similarly, one
can obtain Decrypt(sk; c1 c2 / D m1 m2 in both Rabin’s
and Williams’ cryptosystems with c1 D me1 .mod n/
and c2 D me2 .mod n/ (as shown in Table 1), these
cryptosystems are multiplicatively homomorphic. Thus,
we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 2 One can obtain a multiplicative
homomorphic encryption scheme by placing the
plaintext at the location of the base.
Table 1

RSA class of homomorphic cryptosystems.

Crypto-system

Encryption function

RSA

c D me .mod n/[7]

Rabin

c D me .mod n/[8]

Williams

c D me .mod n/Œ9;10

Homomorphism
Multiplicatively
homomorphic
Multiplicatively
homomorphic
Multiplicatively
homomorphic

3.2

Paillier class of homomorphic encryption
schemes

The Paillier class of homomorphic encryption
schemes includes Paillier[11] , Damgard-Jurik[12] ,
Naccache-Stern[13] , Okamotto-Uchiyama[14] , BGN[15] ,
etc. Paillier[11] based his cryptosystem on the nth composite residues, and Damgard and Jurik[12]
proposed a tweaked scheme. Okamotto-Uchiyama
cryptosystem is constructed on the log function over
the p-Sylow subgroup. The BGN and Naccache-Stern
cryptosystems are designed on the multiplicative cyclic
group. Here we then take the Paillier cryptosystem to
demonstrate this type of homomorphism.
keygen./: Select two large primes p and q. Compute
n D pq and B D fu 2 Zn2 jorder.u/ D k ng. Choose
randomly g 2 B. The public key is .n; g/ and the secret
key is .p; q/.
Encrypt./: takes as input the public key and a
plaintext m 2 Zn . Choose randomly r 2 Zn . This
outputs ciphertext c D g m r n .mod n2 /.
Decrypt./: takes as input the secret key and a
ciphertext c. Let Su D fu < n2 ju  1mod ng and
u 1
L.u/ D
. Compute .n/ D .p 1/.q 1/. This
n
L.c  mod n2 /
outputs m D
.mod n/.
L.g  mod n2 /
Theorem 3 (additively homomorphic property)
The Paillier cryptosystem is additively homomorphic.
Proof Let m1 and m2 be two plaintexts, where c1
and c2 are two ciphertexts that correspond to m1 and
m2 , respectively, i.e., c1 D g m1 r1n .mod n2 / and c2 D
g m2 r2n .mod n2 /.
c1  c2 D .g m1 r1n /  .g m2 r2n /.mod n2 / D g m1 Cm2
.r1 r2 /n .mod n2 /.
L..c1  c2 / mod n2 /
Decrypt.sk; c1  c2 /D
.mod n/D
L.g  mod n2 /
m1 C m2 .
Therefore, the Paillier cryptosystem is additively
homomorphic.

The Paillier class of cryptosystems demonstrates
additive homomorphism that is based on the property of
the exponential function y D ax . For example, let y1 D
ax1 and y2 D ax2 be two exponential functions. Then,
y1 y2 D ax1 Cx2 , which maintains the operation. This
generates an additively homomorphic property. In Table
2, it is easy to see that, in the Damgard-Jurik, NaccacheStern, Okamotto-Uchiyama, and BGN cryptosystems,
there is a factor in the ciphertext. With c1 and c2 , one
can easily obtain Decrypt(sk; c1  c2 / D m1 C m2 ; thus,
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Table 2

Paillier class homomorphic cryptosystems.

and
0

Crypto-system

Encryption function

Paillier

c D g m r n .mod n2 /Œ11
s

Damgard-Jurik c D g m r n .mod nsC1 /Œ12
Naccache-Stern

c D g m .mod n/Œ13

OkamottoUchiyama

c D g m hr .mod n/Œ14

BGN

c D g m r n .mod n2 /Œ15

3.3

ElGamal class of homomorphic encryption
schemes

The ElGamal homomorphic encryption schemes
include the ElGamal cryptosystem[16] and the Elliptic
Curves Cryptosystem (ECC)[17] . The ElGamal
cryptosystem is formed on the finite multiplicative
group, and the ECC is constructed on the finite
multiplicative group on an elliptic curve. The security
of these schemes is based on the intractability of the
discrete logarithm problem. Here, we analyze this type
of homomorphic map and the ElGamal cryptosystem.
keygen./: Choose large prime p, and let ˛ be the
generator of Zp . Choose randomly an integer d with
1 < d < p 2, and then compute ˇ D ˛ d mod p. The
public key is .˛; ˇ/ and the secret key is d .
Encrypt./: takes as input the public key and a
plaintext m 2 Zp . Choose randomly and secretly an
integer k with 1 6 k 6 p 2, and then compute c1 D
˛ k mod p and c2 D mˇ k mod p. This outputs ciphertext
c D .c1 ; c2 /.
Decrypt./: takes as input the secret key and a
ciphertext c. This outputs m D c2  .c1d / 1 .mod p/.
Theorem 5 (multiplicatively homomorphic property)
The ElGamal cryptosystem is multiplicatively
homomorphic.
Proof Let m and m0 be two plaintexts, where c and
0
c are two ciphertexts that correspond to m and m0 ,
respectively, i.e.,
c D .c1 ; c2 / D .˛ k mod p; mˇ k mod p/

0

c 0 D .c10 ; c20 / D .˛ k mod p; m0 ˇ k mod p/;

Homomorphism
Additively
homomorphic
Additively
homomorphic
Additively
homomorphic
Additively
homomorphic
Additively
homomorphic

they are additively homomorphic. Thus, we present the
following theorem.
Theorem
4 One
can
obtain
additive
homomorphism by placing the plaintext at the location
of the exponent.
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c  c 0 D .c1  c10 ; c2  c20 / D
0

0

.˛ k ˛ k mod p; mm0 ˇ k ˇ k mod p/ D
0

0

.˛ kCk mod p; mm0 ˇ kCk mod p/;
Decrypt.sk; c  c 0 / D
c2 c20  ..c1 c10 /d /
.mm0 ˇ

kCk 0

/.˛

1

.mod p/ D

.kCk 0 /d

/

1

mod p D

m  m0 :
Therefore,
the ElGamal cryptosystem is
multiplicatively homomorphic.

The homomorphic property lies in the integer
multiplication and exponential function; therefore,
we call this hybrid class of encryption schemes
homomorphic encryption. The main idea is to conceal
the plaintext with another factor (i.e., the exponential
function) so as to generate homomorphism. Table 3
shows that in the ElGamal and ECC cryptosystems the
plaintext is concealed by an extra factor and that they
are multiplicatively homomorphic. According to this
line of thinking, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 6 One can obtain homomorphism by
approperly concealing plaintext with some other
factors.
Besides the above three classes, there are other means
to design homomorphic cryptosystem, such as by using
a bilinear map[15] and matrix operations[6] in linear error
correcting code cryptosystems.

4

Proposed Targeted Fully Homomorphic
Encryption Scheme

The
RSA
cryptosystem
is
multiplicatively
homomorphic, and the BGN cryptosystem is additively
homomorphic. Here, we describe the proposed public
key encryption system.
Table 3
Cryptosystem

ElGamal class of homomorphic cryptosystems.
Encryption function

ElGamal c D .˛ k mod p; mˇ k mod p/[16]
ECC

c D .l  G; .x; y/ D l  P; mx/
where P D a  G [17]

Homomorphism
Multiplicatively
homomorphic
Multiplicatively
homomorphic
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4.1

The double
scheme

decryption

algorithm

based

The proposed scheme resembles the RSA and the BGN
schemes and, by introducing a new component to the
ciphertext, the proposed scheme can be targeted fully
homomorphic. Since its decryption algorithm consists
of two algorithms, we refer to the proposed scheme
as the double decryption algorithm based scheme. The
proposed scheme is as follows.
keygen./: Choose two large primes p and q,
and then compute n D pq. ˛ is a generator of a
multiplicative cyclic group of order n. Then compute
ˇ D ˛ p mod n. The public key is .˛; ˇ/ and the secret
key is p.
Encrypt./: takes as input the public key and a
plaintext m 2 Zn . Choose randomly and secretly
an integer k with ˇ ¤ 1 mod n. If this condition
is not satisfied, then choose integer k again. Then,
compute c1 D ˛ k mod n, c2 D mˇ k mod n, and c3 D
ˇ kCm mod n. This outputs ciphertext c D .c1 ; c2 ; c3 /.
Decrypt./: takes as input the secret key and a
ciphertext c. The decryption is chosen between the two
algorithms as follows.
Dec1 .c/ D c2  .c1p / 1 .mod n/.
Dec2 .c/: This performs the following steps.
Step 1: c0  c3  .c1p / 1 mod n  ˇ m mod n D
.˛ p /m mod n:
Step 2: Let g D ˛ p . To recover m, it is sufficient to
compute the discrete log of c0 base g. Since 0 6 m <
p
Q n/ time
n. this computation is expected to require O.
using Pollard’s lambda method[18] .
The Dec2 .c/ algorithm takes polynomial time in
n. Thus, the double decryption algorithm based scheme
can only be used to encrypt short message. Clearly, the
best way to employ this scheme is by means of a “digtial
envelop”.
4.2

Targeted fully homomorphic property

The cryptosystem proposed in Section 4.1 is designed
according to the principles disscussed in Section
2. Here, we will analyze its homomorphic property
with the following theorem.
Theorem
7 (targeted
fully
homomorphic
property) The proposed cryptosystem is targeted
fully homomorphic for a fixed form of polynomials and
is fully homomorphic with several interactions.
Proof Let m and m0 be two plaintexts, where c and
c 0 are two ciphertexts that correspond to m and m0 ,
respectively, i.e.,

c D .c1 ; c2 ; c3 / D .˛ k mod n; mˇ k mod n; ˇ kCm mod n/
and
c 0 D .c10 ; c20 ; c30 / D
0

0

0

0

.˛ k mod n; m0 ˇ k mod n; ˇ k Cm mod n/;
c  c 0 D .c1  c10 ; c2  c20 ; c3  c30 / D
0

0

.˛ k ˛ k mod n; mm0 ˇ k ˇ k mod n;
0

0

ˇ kCm ˇ k Cm mod n/ D
0

0

.˛ kCk mod n; mm0 ˇ kCk mod n;
0

0

ˇ kCk CmCm mod n/;
Decrypt.c  c 0 / D
Decrypt.c1  c10 ; c2  c20 ; c3  c30 / D
0

0

Decrypt.˛ kCk mod n; mm0 ˇ kCk mod n;
0

0

ˇ kCk CmCm mod n/:
If one selects Dec1 .c/, then
Dec1 .c  c 0 / D
0

0

Dec1 .˛ kCk mod n; mm0 ˇ kCk mod n/ D
0

0

.mm0 ˇ kCk /.˛ .kCk /p /

1

mod n D

m  m0 :
Thus, it is exponentially homomorphic. If one chooses
Dec2 .c/, then
Dec2 .c  c 0 / D
Dec2 .c1  c10 ; c3  c30 / D
0

0

0

Dec2 .˛ kCk mod n; ˇ kCk CmCm mod n/:
Therefore, one can easily obtain the plaintext m C
m0 using Pollard’s lambda method. Namely, by
choosing Dec2 .c/ the proposed cryptosystem is linearly
homomorphic.
From the above analysis, anyone can obtain the sum
or product of several plaintexts from the corresponding
ciphertexts. For example, let m1 ; m2 ;    ; mk be
plaintexts and let c 1 ; c 2 ;    ; c k be the ciphertexts that
correspond to m1 ; m2 ;    ; mk , respectively. First, one
can compute c 1  c 2      c k D .c11  c12      c1k ; c21 
c22      c2k ; c31  c32      c3k /, and then choose Dec1 .c/
or Dec2 .c/ according to the polynomial operated on
the plaintexts, i.e., we can always obtain the desired
plaintext by choosing the proper decryption algorithm.
One can easily obtain targeted fully homomorphic
encryption when the polynomial has proper form,
such as a homogeneous polynomial or an equal-length
polynomial. It should be noted that targeted fully
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homomorphic encryption can be fully homomorphic
with the interaction, regardless of the form of the
operation polynomial. This can be analyzed using two
conditions.
First, we consider the polynomial a homogeneous
polynomial. The user sends the attribute of the
l Y
k
X
homogeneous polynomial f .xs;i / D
.
xs;i / to
sD1 i D1

the untrusted server or proxy, and the untrusted server or
proxy can compute and send cs D c 1  c 2      c k D .c11 
c12   c1k ; c21 c22   c2k ; c31 c32   c3k / to the user, where
c i are the ciphertexts that correspond to xs;i . Then, the
user performs Dec1 .c1 / for every s D 1; 2;    ; l to
k
Y
obtain xs D
xs;i (i.e., targeted fully homomorphic),
i D1

re-encrypts xs D

k
Y

xs;i to obtain cs0 , and sends cs0 to

iD1

the server or proxy. The sever or proxy can now obtain
and return c10  c20      cl0 to the user. Finally, the user can
easily get f .xs;i /. Here, fully homomorphic encryption
is achieved with the help of this interaction between the
user and the server or proxy.
Second, we consider the polynomial an equal-length
polynomial. The user and the server share the attribute
!
l
k
X
Y
di
xs;i . Similarly, it
 D .k; l/ of f .xs;i / D
sD1

i D1

is targeted fully homomorphic, and the user can obtain
f .xs;i / by several interactions with the server. Thus, it
is fully homomorphic.
Furthermore, any polynomial can be decomposed
into several homogeneous polynomials and equallength polynomials. Therefore, the scheme can be fully
homomorphic whatever the operation polynomial is.
In conclusion, the proposed cryptosystem is targeted
fully homomorphic for a fixed form of polynomials
and fully homomorphic by several interactions with the
server.


5

Semantic Security

The security of our scheme is based on the intractability
of the discrete logarithm problem. To recover the secret
key from the public key, one must solve the discrete
logarithm problem. Obtaining the plaintext m from c1
and c2 or c1 and c3 without the secret key is also
a discrete logarithm problem. The best known attack
methods against the discrete logarithm problem include
Shanks’ algorithm[19] , the Pollard- algorithm[20] , and
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the Polig-Hellman algorithm[21-23] . Here, we provide a
simple proof of the semantic security of the proposed
scheme based on the above discrete logarithm problem.
Theorem 8 (semantic security) The proposed
targeted fully homomorphic encryption scheme is
semantically secure if the discrete logarithm problem
is intractable.
Proof Assume that our scheme is not semantically
secure, i.e., there exists a polynomial time algorithm in
which A (the adversary) who was given .m0 ; m1 ; c D
Encrypt.pk; m 2 fm0 ; m1 g//
(without
loss
of
generality, we assume that m0 < m1 ), can distinguish
E.pk; m0 / and E.pk; m1 / with non-negligible
probability.
We then construct a polynomial time machine B (the
challenger) with the help of A as a black box that
can distinguish E.pk; m0 / and E.pk; m1 / with nonnegligible probability.
Assume a ciphertext c D Encrypt.pk; b/ D .c1 ; c2 ;
c3 / D .˛ k mod n; bˇ k mod n; ˇ kCb mod n/, which is
either Encrypt.pk; 0/ or c D Encrypt.pk; 1/. When
A requests a challenge ciphertext, B computes, c 0 D
f˛ k mod n; .b.m1
m0 / C m1 /ˇ k mod n;
ˇ kCb.m1 m0 /Cm1 mod ng randomizes c 0 into c 00 D
0
0
f˛ k  ˛ k mod n; .b.m1 m0 / C m1 /ˇ k ˇ k mod n;
0
ˇ kCb.m1 m0 /Cm1 ˇ k mod ng and then sends c 00 to A. If
c D Encrypt.pk; 0/, then c 0 D Encrypt.pk; m0 /. If c D
Encrypt.pk; 1/, then c 0 D Encrypt.pk; m1 /.
Adversary A returns an answer c 00 D Encrypt.pk;
m0 / or c 00 D Encrypt.pk; m1 / that can distinguish
E.pk; m0 / from E.pk; m1 /. Thus, challenger B can
judge c D Encrypt.pk; 0/, or c D Encrypt.pk; 1/, i.e.,
challenger B obtains b D 0 or b D 1. In the above
interaction, the challenger solves the problem with the
help of A.
Thus, our targeted fully homomorphic encryption
scheme is semantically secure.


6

Conclusions

In this paper, methods for constructing homomorphic
cryptosystems have been discussed. We have presented
the design of a new targeted fully homomorphic
encryption scheme that applies three components
to ciphertexts and two alternative algorithms for
decryption. The proposed scheme is the first and most
efficient targeted fully homomorphic cryptosystem. The
flaw of the proposed scheme is that we can only prove
its semantic security. In addition, constructing a CCA1
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security fully homomorphic cryptosystem remains an
open problem.
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